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Until  2007,  few  Americans  had  probably  heard  the 
word “subprime” − including many homeowners who 
would come to learn that their own mortgage was a sub-
prime mortgage. Today, subprime mortgages are much 
discussed because they lie at the center of the turmoil 
that roiled credit markets in 2007 and 2008. Analysis 
conducted by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston provides insight into how subprime mortgag-
es became as popular as they did, and why they have 
caused the problems that they have.1 The analysis also 
suggests policy considerations for subprime lending in 
the future.
There is no standard definition of a “subprime” mort-
gage. In essence this term describes a loan that carries 
a relatively high interest rate because it is deemed to 
have a higher risk of default. If a borrower qualified for 
a mortgage on the basis of relaxed standards regard-
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ing creditworthiness (such as borrower credit score, 
debt-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio, and/or loan 
documentation status), the mortgage is generally con-
sidered a subprime mortgage. As would be expected, 
such mortgages carry higher interest rates than prime 
mortgages, due to their higher probability of default.2 
The most common type of subprime mortgage is a “hy-
brid” adjustable-rate mortgage. This type of loan is a 
30-year mortgage with a fixed interest rate for the first 
two or three years. After this initial period, the interest 
rate “resets’’ to some fixed margin over a fluctuating 
benchmark market rate.3 Hybrid subprime mortgages 
are commonly called “2/28s” or “3/27s,” depending on 
the length of the initial fixed-rate period. 
Subprime mortgages have been in use for many years, 
traditionally  serving  a  small  number  of  borrowers 
with blemished credit histories. As late as 1994, they 
constituted  less  than  5  percent  of  total  mortgage 
originations. By 2005, however, they had climbed to 
20 percent of originations. Soon after this peak mar-
ket share was reached, foreclosures in many regional 
housing  markets  began  to  rise  significantly.  Given 
their greater risk, it is not surprising that subprime 
loans have accounted for a disproportionate share of 
these defaults. Some commentators have gone further 
and blamed current housing-market problems almost 
exclusively on subprime lending. But closer analysis 
of these claims shows that they often mischaracter-
ize the role of subprime lending in current housing-
market problems.
Interest Rate Reset
Much of the initial concern about subprime mortgages 
centered on the interest-rate resets of subprime hy-
brids. Because the interest rate on hybrids generally 
rises after the initial two- or three-year period, many 
people  believed  that  subprime  mortgages  were  de-
faulting because subprime borrowers were no longer 
able to afford their loans after they reset. A look at 
some data helps quantify the “reset shock’’ faced by 
subprime borrowers. For 2/28 subprime loans origi-
nated nationwide from 2004 to 2007, the initial inter-
est rate ranged from 7.3 percent in 2004 to 8.6 percent 
in 2007. (See Table 1.) For a typical 2/28 originated 
in  mid-2004,  which  reset  in  mid-2006,  the  interest 
rate rose from 7.3 percent to 11.5 percent, increas-
ing the payments on a $200,000 loan by more than 
$600 per month. Clearly, a reset shock increase of this 
magnitude could place considerable strain on many 
subprime borrowers.
Yet  the  data  show  that  reset  shocks  have  played  a 
minor role in subprime defaults so far. Subprime bor-
rowers who defaulted on their mortgages tended to do 
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Table 1: Average Interest Rates on 2/28 Subprime Mortgages
(annual averages; all data in percentage points)
 
  Initial  1-year  Margin of  6-month LIBOR  Adjusted
  (pre-reset)  prime ARM 1   post-reset rate  2 years after  (post-reset)
  interest rate  rate  over LIBOR2  origination  interest rate
 
2004  7.3  3.9  6.1  5.4  11.5
2005  7.5  4.5  5.9  4.6  10.5
2006  8.5  5.5  6.1  3.03   9.1
2007  8.6  5.7  6.1  3.03  9.1
1 Adjustable rate mortgage.
2 London interbank offered rate.
3 The 2006 and 2007 vintages of mortgages reset in 2008 and 2009. For these mortgages, the 6-month LIBOR two years after origination is assumed 
to be 3.0 percent (the April 2008 value) to allow comparison with other vintages.
Source:  National LP dataset.8    Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
so before their resets occurred. This tendency emerges 
clearly in a dataset of subprime 2/28s originated in 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. From 
this  pool,  the  default  rate  for  mortgages  originated 
in  2005  and  2006  is  indeed  much  higher  than  the 
default rate for 2002 mortgages. But for the more re-
cent loans, the big jump in likelihood of default comes 
before the reset occurs. (See Figure 1.) No significant 
increase in defaults is seen near the actual reset date 
of 24 months. 
If resets are not the problem in the subprime market, 
then why are so many of these loans defaulting? When 
answering this question, the first thing to note is that 
interest rates on subprime hybrids are generally high 
even  in  the  initial  fixed-rate  period.  The  initial  rate 
is sometimes called a “teaser’’ rate because it is often 
lower than the fully indexed rate that the borrower 
pays after the reset occurs. But “teaser” or no, initial 
interest rates have been about three percentage points 
higher  than  rates  on  one-year  prime  adjustable-rate 
mortgages.  Moreover,  the  interest  burdens  faced  by 
many subprime borrowers are even greater than what 
is indicated by the initial and post-reset rates on sub-
prime hybrids. Many subprime purchasers did not have 
enough savings to make sizeable downpayments when 
they bought their homes. To cover the gap between the 
price of the home and the value of the first-lien sub-
prime mortgage, they often relied on second mortgag-
es, sometimes called “piggyback’’ loans. These second 
mortgages  were  generally  fixed-rate,  ten-year  loans 
with higher interest rates than even the initial inter-
est rates on first-lien subprime mortgages. A subprime 
borrower with a high initial interest rate and a costly 
second mortgage faces a substantial interest burden 
even before his reset takes place. 
The high interest rates paid by subprime borrowers 
allowed the subprime lending model to be profitable 
for  lenders,  even  though  most  subprime  borrowers 
never spent much time paying the post-reset rates. In-
stead, subprime borrowers generally refinanced their 
mortgages in advance of, or shortly after, the resets 
occurred. Of the 2/28 subprime loans originated in 
southern New England between 2001 and 2004, more 
than half had been prepaid by the reset date.4 (See 
Figure 2.)
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Declining Home Prices 
High pre-reset interest rates explain why the subprime 
lending model was profitable during the housing boom. 
But they do not explain why default rates for subprime 
loans have risen, because subprime interest rates have 
always been high. To understand the reason for the rise 
in subprime defaults, we must first understand why   
homeowners default in the first place. Defaults typical-
ly occur when homeowners experience life events that 
prevent them from making timely mortgage payments. 
Such a life event can include the loss of a job, illness, 
or divorce. Each of these events can adversely affect 
the borrower’s cash flow and disrupt his ability to keep 
current on a mortgage. Whether a bad life event leads 
to foreclosure depends on whether there is positive or 
negative equity in the home. With positive equity, fore-
closure is unlikely. A homeowner is always better off 
selling the home and pocketing the difference between 
the proceeds of the sale and the outstanding balance 
of the mortgage. Similarly, if a life event causes only 
a temporary cash-flow problem (as would result, for 
example, from a temporary spell of unemployment), a 
homeowner with positive equity can often take out a 
cash-out refinance to tide him over the difficult period.
 
During the first half of the 2000s, house prices rose rap-
idly, so relatively few borrowers – subprime or prime – 
ever found themselves with negative equity. Therefore, 
few borrowers defaulted on their loans and foreclosures 
were rare, even among borrowers undergoing adverse 
life  events.  The  picture  changed  when  house  prices 
began to level off and then decline. Owners who had 
purchased their homes when prices were at their peak 
often found themselves with negative equity as prices 
fell. If an adverse life event occurred to an owner with 
negative equity, foreclosure generally followed. For sub-
prime borrowers, such a life event can occur before the 
interest rates on their loans reset. Thus, it is the recent 
decline in house prices that explains why so many recent 
subprime loans are defaulting even before reset occurs. 
Risk Characteristics of Subprime Loans
Default rates on all types of loans have risen as house 
prices have fallen, but subprime loans have proven par-
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ticularly vulnerable to price declines. An analysis of the 
risk characteristics of subprime loans made during the 
housing boom shows why. One reason that borrowers 
take out subprime mortgages is that they do not have 
sizeable downpayments. Borrowers with low downpay-
ments are more likely to find themselves with negative 
equity when house prices fall, so they are more likely to 
suffer a foreclosure in response to a bad life event. Dur-
ing the housing boom, the average loan-to-value ratio 
for subprime mortgages in southern New England rose 
rapidly, from 82.6 percent in 2000 to 92.8 percent by 
2005. (See Table 2.) A second risk characteristic of sub-
prime loans is documentation status. Borrowers who are 
unable or unwilling to supply documentation for their 
loan applications typically default more often than bor-
rowers who do supply documentation. The fraction of 
fully documented subprime loans in the southern New 
England subprime pool fell from 69.6 percent in 2000 
to 50.2 percent in 2005. A third factor affecting the risk 
of a mortgage is the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio. 
The average for this ratio in the subprime pool rose 
from 37.1 percent in 2000 to 42.0 percent in 2005. All 
three of these factors moved in the direction that would 
make a subprime loan made in 2005 more sensitive to a 
house-price decline than one made in 2000. 
One risk statistic that did improve in the southern New 
England subprime pool is the average credit score of sub-
prime borrowers. Typically, a borrower with a FICO score 
of 620 or higher is considered a “prime borrower,” be-
cause such a borrower would generally be able to obtain a 
prime loan.5 As the housing boom progressed, more and 
more prime borrowers took out subprime loans. In 2000, 
only 44.5 percent of subprime loans were held by prime 
borrowers. By 2004, this fraction had risen to about 71.0 
percent, an increase that is qualitatively similar to those 
found in nationally representative datasets. 
Why is this particular risk characteristic suggesting less 
risk while the other three characteristics are flashing 
the opposite signal? While a credit score of 620 or above 
might qualify a borrower for a prime loan, it would not 
The average debt-to-income ratio for high-score 
borrowers rose from 36.9 percent in 2000 
to                                  in 2005.  41.9%Annual Report 2007    11
qualify him for any prime loan. If a borrower wanted 
to take out a mortgage with a high loan-to-value ratio, 
or one that implied a high debt-to-income ratio, or if 
this borrower did not want to document his income, 
he would likely be turned down by a prime lender. A 
subprime lender, on the other hand, might be willing 
to make this loan – as long as this lender was compen-
sated with a higher interest rate. 
When  we  look  deeper  into  the  pool  of  Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island subprime loans, we 
find that more and more prime borrowers were enter-
ing the subprime pool because they were taking out 
increasingly risky loans. For high-score subprime bor-
rowers, the average loan-to-value ratio rose from 83.8 
percent in 2000 to 93.8 percent in 2005, an increase 
that is similar to the increase for the subprime pool as 
a whole. Changes in documentation status are even 
more pronounced. The share of prime borrowers with 
full documentation fell from 67.0 percent in 2000 to 
only 40.8 percent in 2005. Finally, the average debt-to-
income ratio for high-score borrowers rose from 36.9 
percent in 2000 to 41.9 percent in 2005. 
In short, the subprime market has evolved during the 
past several years. As noted above, this market started 
out by providing loans to risky borrowers. But as the 
housing  boom  gathered  steam,  this  market  began  to 
provide risky loans to a variety of borrowers. The pool 
of subprime borrowers is often portrayed as a mono-
lithic group of borrowers with low credit scores. But the 
reality is that subprime borrowers are a heterogeneous 
group with a wide range of FICO scores and a variety of 
reasons for using this market. What they have in com-
mon is a high vulnerability to the decline in home prices. 
By 2005, the share of subprime mortgages that had a 
risky level of at least one of the four risk characteristics 
(FICO score, loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio, 
and documentation status) had topped 95 percent.
An important policy question is why this transforma-
tion took place. There are many reasons why prime 
borrowers may have found themselves holding risky 
subprime mortgages as the housing boom progressed. 
They may have been “steered” to the subprime mort-
gage market by real estate professionals who encour-
aged them to take out inappropriately risky loans. Al-
ternatively, the high-score borrowers may have found 
their own way to the subprime market, because these 
borrowers wanted to buy houses that prime lenders 
were unwilling to finance. For whatever reason, these 
borrowers turned to the subprime mortgage market 
for  loans  that  they  could  not  have  obtained  in  the 
prime mortgage market. 
Table 2: Risk Characteristics of Subprime Loans in Southern New England 
  
All borrowers   2000  2003  2005  
Number of loans originated      3,171    13,486    30,219 
Average loan-to-value ratio    82.6  88.6  92.8
Share of loans fully documented     69.6  55.5  50.2
Average debt-to-income ratio    37.1  38.9  42.0
Fraction of borrowers with FICO score of 620 or more    44.5  68.2  71.0
Borrowers with FICO score of 620 or more 
Number of loans originated   1,411    9,203   21,442 
Average loan-to-value ratio    83.8  89.8  93.8
Share of loans fully documented    67.0  48.6  40.8
Average debt-to-income ratio    36.9  38.6  41.9
Source: LP dataset for southern New England.     12    Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Late 1980s and Early 1990s versus Now 
Massachusetts has suffered from falling home prices and 
rising foreclosures before. The most notable example 
was the economic recession of the late 1980s and early 
1990s. When the trough of this cycle was reached in 
1992, house prices were down by more than 10 percent 
from their previous peak, while the foreclosure rate was 
more than 5 times its 1990 level. (See Figure 3.) While 
there are some parallels, there are also important differ-
ences between today’s foreclosures and those of the ear-
lier period. To begin with, borrowers losing their homes 
in the early 1990s tended to have lived in their homes 
longer and to have put down sizable downpayments. 
About 80 percent of the early group had lived in their 
home for more than three years; this contrasts with a 
little  more  than  half  of  owners  suffering  foreclosure 
in the current period. (See Table 3.) The difference in 
downpayments at the time of purchase is also striking. 
More than 30 percent of foreclosees in the earlier period 
made a down payment of at least 20 percent at the time 
of purchase. But fewer than 10 percent of foreclosees in 
the current period did so, and more than one third of 
the current foreclosees made no down payment at all.  
These differences stem from the different macroeco-
nomic  environments  of  the  two  foreclosure  waves. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of Massachusetts Foreclosures, 
               1991-1992 and 2006-2007 
  1991  1992  2006  2007
Share of foreclosees living in home...       
      for 2 years or less  11.7  6.6  26.9  25.8
    for more than 3 years  75.1  84.6  57.5  54.9
Share of foreclosees who put down...       
    no downpayment  8.2  8.8  34.5  40.0
    20% or more at purchase   35.9  30.4  8.6  8.0
      
Source: Warren Group dataset.       Annual Report 2007    13
The early 1990s was a period of exceptionally high 
unemployment, with the state’s unemployment rate 
peaking at 8.8 percent in 1991 and 1992. Addition-
ally, the mid-1980s saw an explosion of residential 
construction in Massachusetts. High unemployment 
and a legacy of previous overbuilding put significant 
downward  pressure  on  housing  prices  in  the  early 
1990s,  so  that  even  people  who  moved  into  their 
homes with large equity cushions were in danger of 
having negative equity as prices fell. At the same time, 
the state’s poor labor market caused many Massachu-
setts residents to lose their jobs, thereby supplying 
the negative life events needed to trigger foreclosures 
when negative equity is present. During the current 
foreclosure  wave,  the  macroeconomic  environment 
has not been nearly so bad.
Another difference between the earlier crisis and the 
current  one  involves  the  presence  of  the  subprime 
market. Indeed, the current crisis is often described 
as  a  “subprime  mortgage  crisis,”  as  if  prime  mort-
gages were not a significant factor. As we have seen, 
subprime mortgages are more sensitive to price de-
clines for a number of reasons. Somewhat less than 
half  (45.5  percent)  of  all  defaulted  mortgages  in 
Massachusetts  have  been  subprime  loans,  though 
this  fraction  varies  across  different  types  of  houses 
(single-family,  condominium,  and  multi-family). 
(See Table 4.) It is important to note, however, that 
many  of  these  defaulted  subprime  loans  were  refi-
nances on houses that were originally purchased with 
prime loans. About 30 percent of all foreclosures have 
come on houses originally purchased with subprime 
mortgages, though here again there is some variation 
About                             of all foreclosures have 
come on houses originally purchased with 
subprime mortgages...
30%14    Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
based on the type of house. These statistics point to 
the  quantitative  importance  of  subprime  lending  in 
the current foreclosure wave. But they also show that 
this crisis extends beyond the subprime market. The 
fact that 30 percent of all foreclosures have come on 
houses purchased with subprime mortgages suggests 
that the other 70 percent of foreclosed properties were 
originally purchased with prime loans. 
Policy Considerations
Current  problems  in  the  subprime  market  have  led 
many to ask what role this market should play in the 
future. Proponents of subprime lending argue that this 
market encourages homeownership by extending credit 
to people who may have blemished credit records but 
who are now capable of handling the financial obliga-
tions of homeownership. Other candidates for success-
ful subprime lending include people who do not earn 
...70%  of foreclosed properties were 
originally purchased with prime loans. 
Table 4: Subprime Shares Among Defaulted Massachusetts 
               Ownership Experiences and Mortgages in 2006-07    
  
  Fraction of defaulted    Subprime fraction
  ownerships purchased with    of defaulted
  subprime mortgages    mortgages
Single-family residences  24.2    42.7 
Condominiums  27.5    40.7   
Multi-family residences  42.6    53.3   
      
All Residences  30.0    45.5   
  
Source: Warren Group dataset.       enough to borrow a given amount from a prime lender, 
but who do have other, stable resources to call upon   
if  conditions  change.  Finally,  subprime  lending  can   
encourage homeownership by providing refinance loans 
to people undergoing adverse life events, such as the loss 
of a job. A prime lender may be nervous about extending 
credit to a borrower who has just lost a job, but a sub-
prime lender may be willing to extend such a loan if he is 
compensated for the extra risk. Opponents of subprime 
lending counter that such lending causes more problems 
than it solves. To the extent that subprime borrowers 
are less financially sophisticated than other borrowers, 
they are more likely to fall victim to predatory lending 
schemes or be steered into loans that are inappropriate 
for them but profitable for their lenders. 
The only thing we can say for certain about these claims 
is that to some extent, all of them are true. Subprime 
lending has helped many borrowers into homeowner-
ship; it is worth remembering that even with all of the 
problems in the subprime market, four out of five Mas-
sachusetts homeownerships that began with a subprime 
mortgage have avoided foreclosure. And, undoubtedly, 
some  examples  of  inappropriate  steering  took  place. 
Going forward, the challenge for policy makers will be 
to quantify the offsetting effects of subprime lending on 
the homeownership rate. How many people have been 
moved  into  homeownership  with  subprime  lending, 
and what has been the impact of homeownership on 
other life outcomes, such as wealth accumulation? How 
much financial sophistication is needed to understand 
the typical subprime loan contract, and how much so-
phistication have previous subprime borrowers actually 
had in practice? Finally, how should financial markets 
be regulated to insure that credit is available to finance 
appropriate home purchases? Though subprime lend-
ing has only recently been on the policy agenda, it is 
likely to be at the center of housing policy research for 
some time to come. 
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Endnotes
1 The research examines two types of datasets. The first consists of Registry of 
Deeds data for individual properties in the state of Massachusetts. The second 
is data on individual loans that have been packaged into non-agency mortgage-
backed securities and sold to investors in the secondary market. 
The Registry of Deeds dataset, which is available as far back as the late 1980s, 
permits the study of complete ownership experiences:  For a single owner’s time 
in a given house, all transactions can be traced, including the original purchase 
mortgage(s), refinance mortgages, home equity loans, and foreclosure deeds. This 
dataset was made available to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston by the Warren 
Group, a private Boston firm that has been tracking real estate transactions in New 
England for more than a century. The Warren Group has published the data in its 
newspaper, Banker and Tradesman, since 1872. The Bank gratefully acknowledges 
the Warren Group’s generosity in making this dataset available.
 
The second dataset − loans packaged and sold in the non-agency secondary mar-
ket − provides interest rate information and the borrower’s credit score, as well as 
other characteristics of the loan and the property. The Federal Reserve acquired 
this dataset from First American LoanPerformance, a subsidiary of First American 
CoreLogic, Inc., owned by First American Corporation.
2 Certain lenders, typically mortgage banks, may specialize in subprime loans. 
Banks,  especially  smaller  community  banks,  generally  do  not  make  subprime 
loans, although a few large banking organizations are active through mortgage 
banking  subsidiaries.  According  to  interagency  regulatory  guidance  issued  in 
2001, “the term ‘subprime’ refers to the credit characteristics of individual bor-
rowers. Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit histories that include 
payment delinquencies and possibly more severe problems such as charge-offs, 
judgments, and bankruptcies. They may also display reduced repayment capacity 
as measured by credit scores, debt-to-income ratios, or other criteria that may en-
compass borrowers with incomplete credit histories. Subprime loans are loans to   
borrowers displaying one or more of these characteristics at the time of origination 
or purchase. Such loans have a higher risk of default than loans to prime borrow-
ers. Generally, subprime borrowers will display a range of credit risk characteristics 
that may include one or more of the following: 
•  twoormore30-daydelinquenciesinthelast12months,oroneormore60-day




risk score (FICO) of 660 or below (depending on the product/collateral), or 
other bureau or proprietary scores with an equivalent default probability likeli-
hood; and/or 
• debtservice-to-incomeratioof50percentorgreater,orotherwiselimitedabil-
ity to cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly debt-service 
requirements from monthly income. 
This list is illustrative rather than exhaustive and is not meant to define specific 
parameters for all subprime borrowers.”
3 Most often, the market rate used as an index for the post-reset rate is the six-month 
LIBOR. LIBOR is an acronym for London Interbank Offered Rate, an international 
interbank lending rate similar to the federal funds rate in the United States. The 
typical post-reset interest rate exceeded LIBOR by about six percentage points.
4 Note that prepayment rates have fallen for subprime 2/28’s originated in 2005 
and 2006. This decline stems from the drop in housing prices over this period, a 
topic we return to below.
5 FICO, an acronym for Fair Issac & Co., is a scoring system developed by Fair Isaac 
& Co. and widely used to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers. FICO scores 
range from 300 to 850, with about one-quarter of the U.S. population falling in the 
range of 750 to 799. 